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1. Introduction 
 
Individual investors’ tendency to invest in domestic stocks instead of foreign ones is 
one of the better documented biases (French & Poterba, 1991; Tesar & Werner, 1995), with 
recent studies supporting the persistence of the phenomenon, regardless of decreased foreign 
investment costs (Levy & Levy, 2014). An extension of the home bias is the local bias – 
investor’s tendency to invest locally inside their domestic market – which has gained more 
academic interest in the 2000s. The implications of the theory are that, in addition to globally 
segmented markets, even domestic markets are segmented from an investor’s perspective. This 
phenomenon has been found to apply to both individual investors and professional investment 
managers and has been studied from perspectives varying from information asymmetries to 
stock pricing consequences to portfolio returns (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999; Hong, Kubik, & 
Stein, 2008; Seasholes & Zhu, 2010). Moreover, it has been even discussed in recent studies, 
that investors tend to invest locally based on their birthplace (Lindblom, Mavruk, & Sjögren, 
2018). 
Basic asset pricing theory suggest that an independent market’s returns should be 
defined by the systematic risk in that area. Should the market be small enough, in our case 
“local”, the local market conditions and investor risk tolerance should widely determine the 
risk premium induced in the prices of stocks in the said market. Taking the theory to the 
extreme and saying that all investors in a country only invest in their hometown stocks would 
imply that each town would be their own, independent market and that the stocks traded in 
those markets would only be affected by the local market conditions and local investors’ risk 
tolerance (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2008). 
This thesis aims to replicate and confirm the stock price effects of local bias described 
by Hong, Kubik and Stein (The only game in town: Stock-price consequences of local bias, 
2008). Their main argument is, that stock prices should be affected by regional risk and risk 
tolerance and that the stock price consequences should differ for firms traded on the national 
and local level. To proxy for this effect, the authors construct a variable, RATIO, equal to the 
aggregate book value of all firms in a region, divided by the aggregate income of all households 
in the same region. The tests are conducted both on state and U.S. Census region level and 
results clearly support the hypotheses of the authors – for example, moving from the region 
with highest RATIO to the region with lowest RATIO, stock prices increase 7.9%. In addition 
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to replicating the results, I aim to test whether the phenomenon persists in recent data and to 
conduct further robustness checks on the model. 
The starting point for my tests is to replicate the values of RATIO on Census region 
level. I chose not to replicate the results on state level, since state level data ignores too much 
of the potential investor base of stocks and ultimately results in similar findings as the more 
broad Census region level (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2008). To test the effect of RATIO, I run a 
cross-sectional regression of log of a firm’s market-to-book against RATIO, along with several 
controls. With three different approaches, the results are similar to the findings of Hong, Kubik 
and Stein (2008) – the same move from the region with highest RATIO (Middle Atlantic) to 
the region with lowest RATIO (Deep South) implies a stock price increase of 9.6% in my data. 
Consequently, the theory also suggest that the stock price consequences of local bias 
should differ for large, nationally well-known firms and smaller, locally traded firms. The 
conclusion is intuitive – large blue-chip companies like Johnson & Johnson, Apple or Coca 
Cola are largely independent of the local market conditions, regardless of where they are 
headquartered at. To test this hypothesis, Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008), suggest two proxies 
for firm visibility – low visibility firms are those that fall outside the top quartile measured by 
sales and residual of shareholder number against firm sales. Both approaches result in the same 
conclusion, with RATIO having a bigger impact on smaller, less visible firms. A move from 
Middle Atlantic to Deep South equals a stock price increase of 2.8% for visible firms and an 
increase of 9.1% for less visible firms, measured by firm sales. The shareholder number based 
approach produces an even larger effect, with a 2.9% increase in stock price for visible firms 
and 12.2% increase for less visible firms. 
Finally, I look at the persistence of the phenomenon through time by adding new years 
to the data. Hong, Kubik and Stein’s (2008) data ends at 2005, so adding the most recent 
accounting data from 2017 extends the time-series by 12 years. To keep the values and 
coefficients on RATIO comparable, I compute the RATIO in the same way as before and use 
the same approaches to measure the statistical and economic significance. The results suggest, 
that the economic magnitude of RATIO has decreased in recent years. A move from Middle 
Atlantic to Deep South increases stock price by 8.6%, which is 1 percentage point less than 
with the original data. As a final note, I look at the differences in my replication results and try 
to find a justification for these differences. 
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2. Theory and hypotheses  
 
2.1. Model assumptions 
 
Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008, p. 22) make two basic assumptions of a domestically 
segmented markets. First, a country has N regions, with each region having two kinds of firms 
– visible (V) and hometown (H) firms. Second, each region has two kinds of investors – 
generalist and local experts. Generalists can invest in visible firms in all N regions, whereas 
local experts can only invest in hometown firms in their own region. Combining the two 
assumptions divides the market to (N + 1) segments – N local ones for each region and one 
national market for visible firms. The division between firms and investors makes sense 
considering the findings of Coval and Moskowitz (1999, p. 2047), who argue that locally traded 
firms (i.e. hometown firms) tend to be smaller, highly levered firms, producing locally traded 
goods. Kumar and Sulaeman (2015) argue that the geographical dispersion of value relevant 
information about smaller firms tend to be low and portfolios investing locally generate higher 
risk-adjusted returns via information asymmetries.  
Like Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008, p. 22), I denote each visible firm i, in region j with 
𝐹𝑖𝑗
𝑉 and each hometown firm with 𝐹𝑖𝑗
𝐻 respectively. The book values of visible and hometown 
firms are denoted by 𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝑉  and 𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝐻, with firm dividends at time 1 defined as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑗,1
𝑉 = 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑉𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝑉  for visible firms 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑗,1
𝐻 = 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝐻𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝐻 for hometown firms 
  
The dividends of each firm can be thought as the return on book equity and are assumed to be 
normally distributed with means of 𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝑉  and 𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝐻 and variances of 1. Additionally, all investors 
are assumed to have constant-absolute-risk-aversion (CARA) utility (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 
2008). Also known as exponential utility, the CARA utility function implies that changes in 
risk aversion are independent of changes in wealth as opposed to constant-relative-risk-
aversion (CRRA) utility, which assumes risk aversion to change in relation to changes in wealth 
(Pratt, 1964). The benefit of assuming CARA utility for all investors is the ease of computation 
and as Hong, Kubik and Stein argue (2008, p. 23), it still allows assuming a correlation between 
the level of investors income and risk aversion. Based on the CARA utility, the total risk 
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tolerance in a region j is denoted by 𝑇𝑗, which is distributed between generalists and local 
experts by fractions ϴ and (1 - ϴ). The final assumption is based on the arbitrage-pricing-
theory (APT) (Ross, 1976) with only one factor, allowing the assumption that in all regions, 
there are enough firms to create a diversified portfolio with only market risk. In other words, 
the one-factor APT is simply the CAPM, with a risk-free rate of zero. Thus, the dividends are 
perfectly correlated and all hometown firms in a single region can be treated as a single firm. 
 
2.2. Model and hypotheses construction 
 
The effect I am looking at here is the effect of local bias on stock pricing through 
investor risk tolerance. To establish the existence of such relation and get an idea of the 
economic magnitude, I use the same model as Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) to have the same 
basis for my replication. Furthermore, using the same model allows me to experiment with 
additional data holding all else equal. For both visible and hometown firms, I am using Tobin’s 
Q - a firm’s total market value divided by its total asset value (i.e. book value) - as the primary 
dependent variable. Treating all hometown firms as one, the market value of this firm in region 
j is defined as: 
 
𝑉𝑗
𝐻 = ∑(𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝐻𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝐻)
𝑗
−
(∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝐻
𝑗 )
2
(1 − 𝛳)𝑇𝑗
 
  
The equation implies that a firm’s value is equal to the dividend at time 1 less the 
variance of the dividend divided by the aggregate risk tolerance of all investors in the region. 
Dividing the above equation with the aggregate book value of firms in region j gives us the 
market-to-book ratio of a firm i in the region: 
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1: 𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝐻 = 𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝐻 −
∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝐻
𝑖
(1 − 𝛳)𝑇𝑗
 
  
From this equation, I can directly compute the market-to-book ratio for visible firms 
across all regions. The intuition behind this equation is, that generalists benefit from the returns 
of all visible firms from all regions, but also have to bear the total risk of all visible firms across 
all regions, as the returns are perfectly correlated. 
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𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2: 𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝑉 = 𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝑉 −
∑ ∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝐻
𝑖𝑗
𝛳 ∑ 𝑇𝑗
 
 
As suggested by Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008, p. 22), these equations have two direct 
implications, which I use two construct my two hypotheses. First, the numerator in equation 1 
implies, that the greater the aggregate book value (i.e. risk) of all firms in a region is, the greater 
is the discount applied to the returns of all firms in a region. Second, equation 2 implies that 
for all visible firms, the risk premium should be the same as they share the same market as 
opposed to hometown firms. The consequence of this assumption is, that the effect of local bias 
on those firms should be zero, as they bear no discount from local market conditions. These 
two implications lead to two hypotheses and two empirical tests based on them: 
 
Hypothesis 1. For hometown firms: 𝑀 𝐵⁄ = 𝛽1
𝐻𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑗
𝐻 + 𝛽2
𝐻 ∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝐻
𝑖
(1−𝛳)𝑇𝑗
. The first 
coefficient should be positive, and the second coefficient should be negative. 
 
Hypothesis 2. For visible firms: 𝑀 𝐵⁄ = 𝛽1
𝑉𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑗
𝑉 + 𝛽2
𝑉 ∑ ∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝐻
𝑖𝑗
𝛳 ∑ 𝑇𝑗
. The second 
coefficient for hometown firms should be lower than for visible firms (i.e. 𝛽2
𝐻 <  𝛽2
𝑉) 
 
To have an empirical measure for the second variable Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008, p. 
23) suggest the variable RATIO, which equals the total book value of all firms in a region 
divided by the total income of all households residing in the same region. 
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3. Data and variables 
 
3.1. Sources 
 
The data I use comes from the same sources as used by Hong, Kubik and Stein to enable 
as close replication of results as possible. In addition to replicating the original dataset, I also 
extend the time period of the data from the original 1970 to 2005 to 1970 to 2017. To compute 
the RATIO variable, I obtain data on personal income from the database of the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). The BEA database is also used for obtaining data on other 
demographic variables, such as population density. Firm level market and accounting data is 
obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. 
Market data from CRSP includes stock prices and shares outstanding for companies as well as 
the exchange and industry classification codes. Accounting data from Compustat includes book 
value of equity, depreciation, net income, sales, research and development expenditure and 
state of headquarters.  
 
3.2. Main variables 
 
Using year-end data on market equity value and book equity value, I compute the 
market to book -value for each firm in the dataset. Following the procedures of Hong, Kubik 
and Stein (2008, pp. 25-26), I take the natural logarithm of this variable to make the variable 
more robust in terms of variation, resulting in a more symmetrical distribution. This variable, 
ln(M/B), is my main dependent variable. The main explanatory variables in my regression are 
the RATIO, return on equity and R&D to sales. Also included in the regression are a dummy 
for whether the firm reports R&D expenditure, a dummy for exchange listing (1, 2 and 3 for 
NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq) and a dummy of four-digit SIC-codes for industry classification. 
The RATIO variable is computed from BEA data on personal income and Compustat 
data on equity book value as the ratio of aggregate book value in a region in year t to aggregate 
income in the same region and year. In calculating the RATIO, I exclude dividend income from 
the aggregate income in a region to avoid a straight relationship between stock prices and 
RATIO, as suggested by Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008). Additionally, the RATIO variable is 
recalculated for each firm, excluding the specific firm’s market book value from the 
computation, as otherwise the same variable would be on both sides of the regression. Return 
10 
 
on equity (ROE) is defined as a firm’s net income divided by previous year book equity value. 
R&D to sales is a firm’s research and development expenditure divided by same year sales. To 
factor in outliers in the main explanatory variables and make them more robust, the ln(M/B), 
ROE and R&D to sales variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
3.3. Control variables 
 
In addition to the baseline specification, I add several controls to the regression in 
further robustness checks. State level population and population density are both obtained from 
the BEA database, which I use to compute Census region level per capita income and 
population density. I use three future variables for each company – future region income 
growth, future firm ROE and future firm sales growth. The income and sales growths are 
defined as the average growth rate between years t + 1 and t + 3, whereas future ROE is a 
simple average of the firm’s ROE between years t + 1 and t + 3.  
Industry codes are used to identify conglomerates and firms operating in dominant 
industries in their region. Firms segment information is available from 1976 onwards and I use 
this information to compute a conglomerate dummy for firms operating in multiple segments. 
Dominant industries are identified as those, which contribute to more than 10% of the aggregate 
book equity value in a region in a year and those industries are dropped from the regressions. 
Finally, I also add the natural logarithm of sales and an S&P 500 dummy for firms in the S&P 
500 index.  
 
3.4. Replication of RATIO 
 
To replicate the results of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008), it is important to match the 
raw data as close as possible before running the regressions. The only raw data available as 
reference is the RATIO, but luckily this is also the variable I am most interested in. Table 1 
presents the RATIO on Census region and state level for every five years from 1970 to 2005. 
In addition, time-series and cross-sectional averages and standard deviations are presented. The 
results are consistent with the reference values of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008, pp. 27-28). 
Middle Atlantic is the highest ranking of all Census regions, with RATIO averaging 0.66 
(0.77)1 and Deep South ranking the lowest with an average RATIO of 0.16 (0.21)1. The 
                                                 
1 Table 3 (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2008, p. 27) 
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rankings of the Census region RATIOs are also consistent through time. Regressing the 
rankings of the RATIOs on their lagged values results in a coefficient of 0.99. 
We can also observe the same anomalies in the state level RATIOs as in the results of 
Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008, pp. 27-28). Throughout the time-series, Nebraska has had the 
highest average RATIO with largest standard deviation, which is largely due to the presence 
of Berkshire-Hathaway. Similar high RATIO anomalies also apply to Arkansas, with the 
presence of Wal-Mart and Delaware due to tax laws favourable to businesses. These kinds of 
outliers would imply a measurement error in the RATIO, as the variable only catches the effect 
of a firm’s headquarters and not the actual area of operations (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2008). 
The replicate average RATIOs, however, seem to be lower than the reference values, 
both on Census region and state level. To address this issue and further confirm a successful 
replication, I run a regression between Hong, Kubik and Stein’s RATIOs and my RATIOs. On 
state level, the regression is run on time-series and on Census region level, both on time-series 
and cross-sectional regression as Census regions are the focus regions. The outputs of the 
regression are displayed on Table 2, presenting the regression coefficients, R-squareds and the 
time-series and cross-sectional averages along with standard deviations. We can see that the 
time-series regressions produce almost identical results, regardless of the level of region, with 
both coefficients averaging at 1.12. The cross-sectional regression also produces good results, 
with an average coefficient of 1.00. Even with this limited dataset, I can safely assume that the 
replication also works for all years from 1970 to 2005 and that the regression replication should 
also work. 
My earlier concern of lower RATIOs is further confirmed by the regression results, 
with time-series coefficients averaging over 1.00. As the RATIO values are consistently above 
1.00 however, this should not be an issue. Another remark is to be made from how the RATIO 
acts on a cross-sectional regression. Even though the average coefficient is exactly 1.00 and 
the coefficients are dispersed more evenly around 1.00, there is more deviation in the data and 
the R-squareds for Midwest and Mountain regions drop significantly lower than the R-squareds 
of other regions. This is an expected result as there is likely to be more variation cross-
sectionally than through time. One explanation for such behaviour is that Compustat only has 
the most recent headquarter state of each firm. What this means is that RATIO doesn’t capture 
the information when a company moves its headquarters to another state. This could also 
explain the difference in the cross-sectional data, as the reference data is from 2005 and my 
replication is based on latest data from December of 2017. 
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3.4. RATIO with additional years and new hypothesis. 
 
 Next, my attention turns to computing the RATIO on Census region and state level 
with completely new data. With the original data ranging from 1970 to 2005 and latest data 
ranging up to 2017, I have 12 additional years to do the tests with. In computing the new values 
of RATIO, I focus entirely on Census regions and comparing the new values to old ones. The 
results of this comparison are displayed on Table 3, presenting the time-series means and 
standard deviations of RATIO on three different timelines – original from 1970 to 2005, 
extended from 1970 to 2017 and new from 2006 to 2017. The message of this table is clear; 
the values of RATIO have increased throughout Census regions. The average increase in 
RATIO comparing the original and extended data is equal to 10.7%, whereas comparison of 
the original and new data results in an average increase of 42,9% between Census regions. 
Considering the decomposition of RATIO (aggregate book-value / aggregate income 
in a region), the only sensible explanation is, that the aggregate book-value has increased more 
than the aggregate income, as it is highly unlikely that either of the variables would have 
decreased throughout the year. Indeed, this is the case – on average, aggregate book-value has 
grown by 7,8% in all Census regions, whereas aggregate income has increased on average 
6,5%.  
Arguably, the increase in RATIO in recent years is radical and raises the question of its 
economic significance. Looking back at the local bias model, an increase in RATIO keeping 
all else equal, should result in a lower stock price. Interestingly, the other explanatory variable, 
firm ROE, has decreased on average by 1% through the whole time period, and while this 
estimate is purely directional, it gives some reference for the change in RATIO. With stock 
prices and RATIO increasing at the same time, an explanation emerges endogenously from the 
model: 
 
Hypothesis 3: For both hometown firms and visible firms, the effect of RATIO has 
decreased through 2006 to 2017.  
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Table 1 - Summary of RATIOs on Census region and state level 
  1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005   Mean S.D. 
                        
Panel A: Census regions                       
New England 0.38 0.49 0.52 0.45 0.42 0.51 0.56 0.62   0.49 0.06 
Middle Atlantic 0.64 0.69 0.70 0.54 0.48 0.55 0.80 0.93   0.66 0.13 
Midwest 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.48   0.47 0.03 
Plains 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.35 0.44 0.60   0.32 0.09 
Atlantic Coast 0.32 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.32 0.40 0.47   0.34 0.05 
Deep South 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.22 0.23 0.24   0.16 0.05 
Southern Plains 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.52 0.46 0.49 0.74 0.74   0.58 0.08 
Mountain 0.23 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.24 0.28 0.26   0.22 0.05 
West Coast 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.30 0.50 0.50   0.31 0.09 
Cross-sectional mean 0.36 0.40 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.49 0.54       
Cross-sectional S.D. 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.22       
                        
Panel B: States                       
New England                       
Connecticut 0.69 0.89 0.94 0.67 0.60 0.64 0.48 0.56   0.70 0.16 
Maine 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02   0.05 0.01 
Massachusetts 0.33 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.61 0.82 0.92   0.56 0.16 
New Hampshire 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.10 0.13   0.14 0.04 
Rhode Island 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.39 0.45   0.30 0.07 
Vermont 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.06   0.05 0.03 
                        
Middle Atlantic                       
New Jersey 1.06 1.00 0.97 0.50 0.39 0.56 0.97 0.57   0.74 0.25 
New York 0.58 0.67 0.71 0.69 0.64 0.69 1.00 1.43   0.78 0.24 
Pennsylvania 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.38   0.37 0.10 
                        
Midwest                       
Illinois 0.70 0.74 0.80 0.79 0.71 0.74 0.65 0.69   0.73 0.04 
Indiana 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.38   0.16 0.06 
Michigan 0.69 0.63 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.44 0.39 0.29   0.49 0.13 
Ohio 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.33 0.41 0.45 0.51   0.42 0.05 
Wisconsin 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.28   0.22 0.03 
                        
Plains                       
Iowa 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.08 0.20   0.16 0.04 
Kansas 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.28 0.71   0.17 0.11 
Minnesota 0.34 0.42 0.45 0.40 0.32 0.41 0.47 0.67   0.43 0.07 
Missouri 0.27 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.40 0.38 0.36   0.35 0.03 
Nebraska 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.31 0.38 0.74 1.55 1.96   0.67 0.58 
North Dakota 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.11   0.10 0.03 
South Dakota 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.07   0.06 0.04 
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  1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005   Mean S.D. 
                        
Atlantic Coast                       
Delaware 1.59 1.89 1.41 1.70 1.58 0.97 1.07 0.50   1.44 0.39 
District of Columbia 0.27 0.36 0.44 0.47 0.64 1.37 1.16 1.60   0.76 0.43 
Florida 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.21   0.17 0.04 
Georgia 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.49 0.41 0.44 0.60 0.66   0.46 0.10 
Maryland 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.25   0.20 0.02 
North Carolina 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.40 0.66 0.93   0.43 0.19 
South Carolina 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.08   0.11 0.03 
Virginia 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.56 0.67   0.56 0.05 
West Virginia 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06   0.02 0.02 
                        
Deep South                       
Alabama 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.23   0.12 0.07 
Kentucky 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.10 0.14   0.13 0.02 
Mississippi 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05   0.04 0.02 
Tennessee 0.15 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.35 0.38 0.39   0.27 0.08 
                        
Southern Plains                       
Arkansas 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.17 0.32 0.54 0.77 1.07   0.36 0.31 
Louisiana 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.30 0.31 0.20 0.57 0.16   0.21 0.11 
Oklahoma 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.26 0.39   0.19 0.07 
Texas 0.91 0.92 0.87 0.68 0.57 0.60 0.83 0.87   0.77 0.13 
                        
Mountain                       
Arizona 0.33 0.33 0.24 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20   0.23 0.06 
Colorado 0.23 0.32 0.25 0.19 0.18 0.39 0.51 0.45   0.32 0.14 
Idaho 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.42 0.37   0.26 0.07 
Montana 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.02   0.06 0.02 
Nevada 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.27 0.24 0.29   0.20 0.05 
New Mexico 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07   0.06 0.03 
Utah 0.51 0.42 0.31 0.21 0.17 0.27 0.15 0.19   0.26 0.11 
Wyoming 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.01 0.01 
                        
West Coast                       
California 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.32 0.50 0.51   0.33 0.08 
Oregon 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.17   0.17 0.04 
Washington 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.64 0.58   0.25 0.18 
                        
Cross-sectional mean 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.33 0.40 0.45       
Cross-sectional S.D. 0.31 0.34 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.34 0.42       
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Table 2 - Results of regression reference vs. replicate RATIOs 
STATE   CENSUS REGION 
Time-series   Time-series   Cross-section 
  RATIO R-squared     RATIO R-squared     RATIO R-squared 
1970 1.13 0.91   1970 1.19 0.96   Atlantic Coast 1.03 0.86 
1975 1.15 0.95   1975 1.20 0.98   Deep South 1.06 0.96 
1980 1.21 0.94   1980 1.21 0.98   Middle Atlantic 0.95 0.98 
1985 1.12 0.93   1985 1.09 0.94   Midwest 0.84 0.57 
1990 1.11 0.91   1990 1.09 0.96   Mountain 1.01 0.42 
1995 1.18 0.93   1995 1.19 0.96   New England 0.93 0.96 
2000 1.18 0.89   2000 0.94 0.92   Plains 1.03 0.96 
2005 0.92 0.72   2005 1.07 0.97   Southern Plains 0.91 0.89 
                West Coast 1.21 0.99 
                      
Mean 1.12     Mean 1.12     Mean 1.00   
S.D 0.09     S.D. 0.09     S.D. 0.10   
 
 
Table 3 - RATIO summary on different timelines (Census) 
  1970-2005   1970-2017   2006-2017 
  Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
New England 0.49 0.06   0.54 0.09   0.66 0.04 
Middle Atlantic 0.66 0.13   0.73 0.17   0.94 0.06 
Midwest 0.47 0.03   0.48 0.03   0.49 0.04 
Plains 0.32 0.09   0.40 0.16   0.64 0.08 
Atlantic Coast 0.34 0.05   0.36 0.06   0.42 0.04 
Deep South 0.16 0.05   0.18 0.05   0.21 0.01 
Southern Plains 0.58 0.08   0.63 0.12   0.80 0.05 
Mountain 0.22 0.05   0.23 0.05   0.27 0.03 
West Coast 0.31 0.09   0.38 0.16   0.60 0.08 
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4. Results 
 
4.1. Regression model and methodology 
 
To test hypothesis 1, the following equation is computed to use as the baseline 
regression: 
 
ln(𝑀 𝐵⁄ ) = 𝐵1𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝐵2(𝑅&𝐷 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁄ ) + 𝐵3𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 + 𝐵4𝑅&𝐷_𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝐵5𝑆𝐼𝐶 + 𝐵6𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 
 
The regression follows directly from the earlier model, where market-to-book value is 
explained by firm ROE and region RATIO, now also including the ratio of research and 
development expenditure to sales. In addition, the baseline regression includes dummies for 
whether the firm reports R&D expenditures (1 or 0), a 4-digit SIC code specifying the firm’s 
industry and a dummy for exchange listing, with possible values of 1, 2 and 3 for NYSE, 
AMEX and Nasdaq. Excluded from the regression are companies with a book value below ten 
million dollars and companies with a SIC code starting with 6 belonging to financial-services 
industry. Additionally, RATIO is calculated separately for each firm, excluding the book value 
of the firm in question to avoid the same value appearing on both sides of the regression. 
While ROE and R&D / Sales are calculated separately for each firm, RATIO only has 
nine independent observations per year, when looking at RATIOs at the Census region level, 
as noted by Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008, p. 29). To put this into scale, each year has on 
average a total of 3394 observations. Due to the low number of observations, RATIO is 
expected to display high cross-correlation. As noted before, the ranks of RATIO vary little over 
time, so the sample should also display autocorrelation to some extent. To address the issues 
of cross-correlation and autocorrelation, Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) propose three different 
approaches. 
The first approach is the Fama-Macbeth regression (Fama & MacBeth, 1973). In this 
approach, I run a separate cross-sectional regression for each year from 1970 to 2005 making 
the total number of regressions 36. The coefficients of these regressions are then averaged, and 
the statistical significance is evaluated based on the standard errors. I use Newey-West adjusted 
standard errors, with one lag, to correct the coefficients for autocorrelation (Newey & West, 
1987). 
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Fama-Macbeth approach works well when there is no fixed or slow-decaying effect in 
the data, but understates the standard errors in the presence of the aforementioned, even with 
Newey-West adjusted standard errors (Petersen, 2009). The second approach, a single pooled 
regression with clustered standard errors, however, works well even with fixed or slow 
decaying effects. In this approach, the whole dataset is pooled and all other variables, other 
than RATIO, are allowed to interact with a year dummy (i.e. the effect of RATIO is fixed). 
Whereas the Fama-Macbeth approach used Newey-West adjusted standard errors, in single-
pooled regression the standard errors are clustered at the region level to adjust for 
autocorrelation. 
As the third approach, Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) derive a “collapsed” regression 
from the baseline regression. In this approach, I run the baseline regression for each year, but 
drop the RATIO from the right-hand side. From these regressions, the residuals are averaged 
at the Census region level for each year, resulting in nine independent residuals per year. 
Finally, I run a pooled regression, where the dependent variable is the firm-level residual and 
the explanatory variables are the RATIO and a year dummy. Similarly, to the single pooled 
regression, the standard errors are clustered at the region level. 
 
4.2. Baseline replication 
 
The results of the baseline specification with three different approaches, replicating the 
results of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008, p. 29), are displayed on Table 4. First, are presented 
the yearly cross-sectional coefficients on RATIO, R&D / Sales and ROE and R-squared of the 
Fama-Macbeth regression. Second, are the average coefficients, their statistical significances 
(*** = 0.001 and ** = 0.01), Newey-West adjusted standard errors and the number of cross-
sectional coefficients with the sign predicted by Hypothesis 1. Finally, the coefficients on 
RATIO are presented for the single pooled and collapsed regressions with statistical 
significances and clustered standard errors. 
Based on the regression coefficients and standard errors, the replication of the effect of 
RATIO is successful with an average coefficient of -0.153 (-0.150)2 and a standard error of 
0.025 (0.020)2. The number of RATIOs with negative sign is 33/36 (35/36)2, which is still in 
line with Hypothesis 1, with positive RATIO coefficients only breaking slightly above zero. 
On the other hand, the replication of the effect of R&D / Sales and ROE is not as successful. 
                                                 
2 Table 5 (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2008, p. 31) 
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The average coefficients of 3.11 (2.08)3 and 0.624 (1.79)3 and the standard errors of 1.02 
(2.73)3 and 0.194 (1.19)3 deviate too much from the reference values of Hong, Kubik and Stein 
(2008), to consider the replication of these variables successful. This applies especially to the 
standard errors, being two times lower for R&D / Sales and six times lower for ROE even with 
the Newey-West adjustment. The issue is most probably generated by the data itself as the 
replicate values of RATIO are very close to the reference values. As the effect of the two 
variables still supports Hypothesis 1, the results, however, do not contradict the original 
findings of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008).  
With my focus on the RATIO variable, we can now look at the replication of the two 
remaining approaches – the single pooled and collapsed regressions. Both the pooled regression 
and the collapsed regression produce results similar to the Fama-Macbeth regression, taking a 
negative sign as predicted. The results also support the argument of Petersen (2009), with both 
standard errors increasing compared to the Fama-Macbeth regression. The pooled regression 
results in a coefficient of -0.183 (-0.136)3 and a standard error of 0.041 (0.034)3, while the 
collapsed regression results in a coefficient of -0.098 (-0.105)3 and a standard error of 0.028 
(0.029)3. Pooled regression taking the largest negative coefficient is an unexpected result as it 
overstates the coefficient on RATIO compared to the other two approaches.  
Considering the results of the baseline replication, the economic significance of RATIO 
should also be closely related to the economic significance that Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) 
find in their results. Using the pooled regression as a benchmark, we can look at the difference 
in RATIO between the highest and lowest values. These RATIOs are Middle Atlantic’s 0.66 
and Deep South’s 0.16. The regression results suggest that the difference in ln(M/B) between 
the two Census regions is 0.183 ∗ (0.66 − 0.16) = 0.092. In absolute magnitude, the 
difference is equal to a 9.6% increase, when moving from Middle Atlantic to Deep South 
(𝑒0.092 − 1). The same effect, that Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) observe in their results, is 
equal to 7.9%, leading the replicated pooled regression to overstate the economic magnitude 
of RATIO.  
 
  
                                                 
3 Table 5 (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2008, p. 31) 
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Table 4 - Summary of baseline specification results on Census region level 
  RATIO R&D to sales ROE R-squared 
1970 0.037 8.88 3.62 0.41 
1971 -0.054 10.7 2.62 0.30 
1972 -0.099 12.4 0.212 0.10 
1973 -0.087 12.6 3.31 0.27 
1974 -0.074 8.27 0.484 0.09 
1975 -0.117 9.58 2.03 0.29 
1976 -0.127 8.61 2.48 0.34 
1977 -0.075 6.76 1.90 0.28 
1978 -0.179 7.69 0.805 0.17 
1979 -0.163 10.6 0.246 0.11 
1980 -0.082 8.73 1.30 0.23 
1981 -0.118 4.42 0.181 0.07 
1982 -0.266 1.21 0.240 0.09 
1983 -0.116 0.173 0.816 0.14 
1984 -0.195 0.268 0.481 0.08 
1985 -0.193 0.452 0.016 0.04 
1986 -0.209 0.283 0.035 0.02 
1987 -0.283 0.076 0.082 0.03 
1988 -0.215 0.033 0.526 0.07 
1989 -0.299 0.034 0.092 0.03 
1990 -0.373 0.111 0.073 0.04 
1991 -0.340 0.001 0.182 0.06 
1992 -0.124 0.003 0.049 0.05 
1993 -0.192 0.003 -0.005 0.05 
1994 -0.349 0.000 0.005 0.09 
1995 -0.407 0.002 0.133 0.12 
1996 -0.362 0.001 0.003 0.10 
1997 -0.062 0.003 0.051 0.06 
1998 -0.153 0.002 0.047 0.08 
1999 -0.036 0.004 0.002 0.15 
2000 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.08 
2001 0.031 0.000 0.253 0.10 
2002 -0.047 0.000 0.008 0.04 
2003 -0.044 0.004 0.027 0.12 
2004 -0.047 0.001 0.050 0.07 
2005 -0.114 0.000 0.098 0.08 
          
Avg. coefficient -0.153*** 3.11** 0.624***   
F-M std. error (0.025) (1.02) (0.194)   
# With predicted sign 33/36 36/36 35/36   
          
Pooled regression -0.183*** (0.041)       
Collapsed regression -0.097*** (0.028)       
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4.3. Control replication 
 
In additional robustness checks, I replicate the controls of Hong, Kubik and Stein 
(2008). The summary of these controls is displayed on Table 5, presenting the coefficients on 
RATIO and each control with their standard errors and statistical significances (*** = 0.001 
and ** = 0.01). The baseline specification, presented on row 1, is the earlier pooled regression 
model, being more robust to the evident autocorrelation in the data. Row 2 adds per capita 
income in a Census region to the regression. With both the coefficient and standard error 
approaching zero, the variable fails in adding anything to the regression. One possible 
explanation for the issue is, that per capita income is measured in absolute value, while the 
dependent variable is in logarithmic scale. Indeed, per capita income in 2005 is, on average, 
8.5 times higher than in 1970. Takings logs of the per capita income values results in a 
coefficient of 0.102 for per capita income and -0.209 for RATIO and standard errors of 0.034 
and 0.042 respectively, with both variables being statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Row 3 adds region population density to the regression. The economic significance of 
this variable is arguably very low, with a coefficient of -0.0003. Similar to the results of Hong, 
Kubik and Stein (2008), population density effectively invalidates RATIO with a coefficient 
of -0.007 (-0.003)4. The authors address this issue by suggesting that population density better 
captures the locality of firms, for example through operational presence. The effect of the 
variable, however, motivates the next three controls as population density might proxy for other 
variables that actually belong in the regression (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2008). 
Next, I add future region income growth, future firm ROE and future firm sales growth, 
both separately and together, on row 3 to 6. Income growth is defined as the average growth 
rate of Census region aggregate income through years t + 1 to t + 3. Firms sales growth is 
defined in a similar way for firm sales. Future firm ROE is simply an average of the firms ROE 
through years t + 1 and t + 3. Adding these variables yields some interesting results – while 
future ROE and sales growth have little impact on RATIO, future income growth on the other 
hand affects RATIO more than any other control in the tests. The results also directly contradict 
the findings of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008), with income growth taking a coefficient of 2.47 
(0.031)4, implying that income growth in a region actually does have a role in explaining stock 
pricing. 
                                                 
4 Table 6 (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2008, p. 32) 
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The rest of controls through rows 8 to 11 are on line with the results of Hong, Kubik 
and Stein (2008)4. Dominant industries on row 8 are defined as those, that constitute to more 
than 10% of the aggregate book value on state level, in a year. The reasoning behind this 
variable is, that dominant industries might introduce idiosyncratic risk premium in a local 
market, otherwise defined by the market risk (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2008). Conglomerates on 
row 9 are defined as firms operating on multiple segments and the two last controls are the log 
of sales and a dummy for firms in the S&P 500 index. None of these controls affect the 
coefficient on RATIO in any significant way.  
Even with a higher coefficient on RATIO, the effect of adding controls is similar to the 
results of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008), leading me to conclude that the difference in the 
coefficient on RATIO is merely a question of different level. Adding future income growth, 
however, yields contradicting results both on the coefficient on the variable itself and its effect 
on the coefficient on RATIO. This is a matter I will look more closely into, later in my 
additional controls. 
 
Table 5 - Summary of pooled regression with controls 
  RATIO Future region 
income growth 
Future firm 
ROE 
Future firm 
sales growth 
Misc. 
1.Baseline specification 
-0.183***         
(0.041)         
2. Add region per capita income 
-0.173***       1.9e-6 
(0.043)       (2.3e-6) 
3. Add region population density 
-0.007       -0.0003*** 
(0.055)       (7.3e-5) 
4. Add future region income growth 
-0.123** 2.47***       
(0.042) (0.213)       
5. Add future firm ROE 
-0.195***   0.504***     
(0.040)   (0.090)     
6. Add future firm sales growth 
-0.183***     6.5e-5   
(0.041)     (5.9e-5)   
7. Add all future controls 
-0.144*** 2.10*** 0.498*** 8.4e-5   
(0.040) (0.217) (0.089) (5.7e-5)   
8. Remove dominant industries 
-0.174***         
(0.044)         
9. Add conglomerate dummy 
-0.182***       0.019 
(0.041)       (0.017) 
10. Add log sales 
-0.182***       0.037*** 
(0.041)       (0.004) 
11. Add S&P 500 indicator 
-0.183***       0.335*** 
(0.040)       (0.017) 
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4.4. RATIO and visible vs. hometown firms 
 
Hypothesis 2 assumes that the coefficient on RATIO is dependent on the visibility of 
the firm – specifically it should be lower for hometown firms than for visible firms. To test this 
hypothesis, I use the same proxies for firm visibility as Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008). The first 
proxy is a dummy equalling 1 for firms with sales below the top quartile in any period. The 
second one is a dummy equalling 1 for firms, with shareholder base falling outside the top 
quartile in any period. In detail, the second dummy is defined through a regression of the log 
of a firm’s shareholder number against the log of its sales. The residuals of firm shareholders 
are then used to find the firms falling outside the top quartile.  
 Next, I run the baseline pooled regression, now also including the dummy for firm 
visibility and an interaction term between the visibility dummy and RATIO (i.e. 
𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 ∗ 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂), with both proxies for visibility. Table 6 displays the results of 
this regression, presenting the coefficients, standard errors and statistical significances (** = 
0.01) of RATIO and the interaction term. We can clearly see, that there is no difference on the 
coefficient on RATIO between the two proxies, with both taking negative signs. The first proxy 
is closer to the results Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008), with coefficients of -0.056 (-0.071)5 on 
RATIO and -0.118 (-0.097)5 on the interaction term. The corresponding coefficients on the 
second proxy are -0.057 (-0.056)5 and -0.173 (-0.109)5. 
 The economic significance of visibility is clear, if we look at the difference in RATIOs 
between Middle Atlantic (0.66) and Deep South (0.16). Starting with the sales proxy, for visible 
firms, a change from Middle Atlantic to Deep South is equal to a 2.8% increase in stock price. 
For low visibility firms, the same effect is equal to an increase of 9.1%6 in stock price. Using 
the shareholder proxy, the economic significance is even larger. Moving from Middle Atlantic 
to Deep South is equal to a 2.9% increase in stock price for visible firms and 12.2% for low 
visibility firms. 
 
Table 6 - The effect of firm visibility on RATIO 
Low visibility proxy RATIO (Low visibility) x RATIO 
1. Sales below top quartile -0.056 (0.052) -0.118** (0.052) 
2. Residual no. of shareholders below 
top quartile 
-0.057 (0.049) -0.173** (0.033) 
                                                 
5 Table 9 (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2008, p. 35) 
6 𝐸𝑥𝑝((0.056 + 0.118) ∗ 0.50) − 1 
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4.5. Tests with additional years 
 
Having confirmed stock pricing implication of RATIO and how it affects visible and 
hometown firms differently, I now look at the persistence of the phenomenon through time. 
Hypothesis 3 suggests, that as stock prices and values of RATIO have simultaneously 
increased, the effect of RATIO has decreased on the contrary. To test my hypothesis, I run the 
same three baseline regressions on two different timelines – from 1970 to 2017 and from 2006 
to 2017. It is noteworthy, that since Fama-Macbeth regression essentially treats each year as 
one observation and the pooled and collapsed regressions fix the effect of RATIOS, it is highly 
unlikely that any of the approaches produce any meaningful results on the latter timeline with 
only 12 independent observations. 
Table 7 displays the summary statistics of the three regressions on two timelines, 
presenting the coefficients, standard errors and statistical significances (*** = 0.001, ** = 0.01) 
of each variable. The results from the first timeline are very similar to the original regression 
with coefficients on RATIO taking negative signs as predicted and the ranks of the coefficients 
still in the same order. The coefficients on RATIO from all three regressions also support 
Hypothesis 3, with all three coefficients increasing. In absolute values, both the Fama-Macbeth 
coefficient and the pooled coefficient decrease by approximately 18%, whereas the collapsed 
coefficient drops by 40%. Considering the economic magnitude of this change, a firm moving 
from Middle Atlantic to Deep South leads to an 8.6%7 increase in stock price, whereas the 
increase was equal to 9.6% in the original sample. 
As predicted, the results from the latter timeline are not of much interest. While two of 
the three regressions retain the negative coefficient on RATIO, all three regressions produce 
results, that are not statistically significant. It is clear that the newly introduced data affects 
how RATIO behaves on the whole timeline, but based on these results, it is still too early to 
say, whether the change in the economic magnitude is permanent or not.    
 
  
                                                 
7 𝐸𝑥𝑝((0.73 − 0.18) ∗ 0.150) − 1 
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Table 7 - Summary of baseline specification with additional years 
1970 - 2017 RATIO R&D to sales ROE 
        
Avg. coefficient -0.125*** 2.33** 0.483*** 
F-M std. error (0.022) (0.814) (0.153) 
# With predicted sign 42/48 48/48 45/48 
        
Pooled regression -0.150*** (0.037)     
Collapsed regression -0.058** (0.022)     
        
        
2006 - 2017 RATIO R&D to sales ROE 
        
Avg. coefficient -0.037 0.001 0.063*** 
F-M std. error (0.019) (0.001) (0.020) 
# With predicted sign 9/12 12/12 10/12 
        
Pooled regression -0.037 (0.046)     
Collapsed regression 0.001 (0.034)     
 
 
4.6. Explaining growth controls 
 
  In the last part of my tests, I try to explain the adverse effect of future income growth 
control on the coefficient on RATIO. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) find that this variable has 
no effect on RATIO and is not statistically significant, whereas my results suggest exactly the 
opposite. In fact, my results suggest that the effect of future income growth is the largest of all 
controls. Remember, that the aggregate income in a region is the denominator of RATIO, so 
next I will also look at the numerator, aggregate book value in a region. 
I run the baseline regression again, now adding the growth rate of aggregate book value 
in a region. I compute this variable in a similar way as the earlier growth controls, i.e. for years 
t + 1 to t + 3. Table 8 displays the results of this regression. Rows 1 to 3 three are the same as 
in Table 5 and rows 3 and 4 add the effect of region book value growth and the effect of both 
growth controls respectively. The effect of region book value growth on RATIO is smaller than 
the effect of region income growth, while still affecting the coefficient on RATIO more than 
other previous controls. Book value growth also has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on stock pricing. 
As expected, adding both controls decrease the coefficient on RATIO even more and 
the individual effect of both controls is also decreased. Book value growth is still not able to 
take out the effect of income growth, so these two variables must proxy for some phenomenon 
25 
 
that explains stock pricing. Considering the computation of RATIO, an increase in income 
should translate to increased risk tolerance of investors in a region, according to the CARA 
utility function. In this simple model, increased risk tolerance would in turn translate to 
increased investments in stocks and thus increasing the stock prices. While book value growth 
explains some variation in the coefficient on RATIO, the change in book value is probably 
more of a consequence than a cause for changes in stock prices.  
The root of the difference in the results of income growth remain inconclusive. Having 
replicated RATIO and the controls as closely as possible, there are two possible explanations 
for why the results differ. First, Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) might have done additional 
controlling on the data, that is not explicitly explained in their research or the variables are 
computed in a more complex way. The second, and more worrying, explanation is that the raw 
income data differs, resulting in a difference in the regression. As the raw values of RATIO are 
a close match, however, this seems unlikely. 
Regardless of the difference in results, region income growth still doesn’t wipe out the 
basic finding – the negative effect of RATIO on stock pricing. The negative sign still present 
and the coefficient staying statistically significant, a measurement error in one control doesn’t 
affect the whole outcome of the tests. 
 
Table 8 - Summary of RATIO constituent controls 
  RATIO Future region income 
growth 
Future region bookvalue 
growth 
1. Baseline specification 
-0.183***     
(0.041)     
2. Add region income growth 
-0.123** 2.47***   
(0.042) (0.213)   
3. Add region book value growth 
-0.154***   0.801*** 
(0.041)   (0.064) 
4. Add both future controls 
-0.117** 1.90*** 0.569*** 
(0.042) (0.227) (0.068) 
  
26 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 The findings of this thesis directly support the findings of Hong, Kubik and Stein 
(2008), from the replication of raw data to the replication of results. Theory suggests that local 
market conditions should affect stock pricing and indeed, this is confirmed in the tests. 
Ultimately, the differences between regions boils down to local supply and demand of stocks, 
which translates to differences in stock prices due to different equilibriums. The results are also 
robust, which is confirmed by three different regression approaches and additional controls. 
While some of the controls display a larger effect than expected, the basic findings still stay 
the same. 
The results also confirm, that local bias treats large, well-known firms and smaller, local 
firms differently. Independent of the local market conditions, larger firms’ stock prices tend to 
differ by less than 3% on average, between regions with highest and lowest values of RATIO. 
For smaller firms, the price difference could vary between 9% and 12%, depending on the 
proxy for visibility. This result is intuitive – a small firm, with geographically focused 
operations is more vulnerable to local market conditions and trading on such firms contains 
more information asymmetries, compared to large firms followed by many analysts. 
 Additionally, my tests with new data confirm, that the phenomenon persists to date and 
is economically significant. This finding is analogous to the findings of Levy and Levy (2014), 
who concluded at the time, that home bias had stayed pretty much unchanged for the last 15 
years. Interestingly, the results suggest that the effect of local bias is in small decline, with the 
price discount implied by RATIO dropping by 1 percentage point. Even with these results, two 
questions remain – is the change in the pricing implications of RATIO permanent and if so, 
does the decline of the effect continue or does it converge to a certain level. 
 As a final note, it is good to understand what the results imply and what they don’t. As 
Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) point out, the model treats firms changing region with ceteris 
paribus assumption. This assumption is not exactly realistic, since the model treats firm ROE 
as a fixed variable and assumes it is independent from region change. Even more, this also 
implies that there is little benefit to be achieved from an arbitrage point of view, since the 
changes in returns are likely to be small relative to the risks and transaction costs implied by a 
region change (Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2008).  
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